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RUSSIA’S LACK OF AMERICAN-STYLE 
AGENCY PRINCIPLES: A PRIMARY CAUSE 








With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians found themselves 
in a situation comparable to redesigning an aircraft in mid-flight:
1
 a 
massive, poorly-functioning economy had to be redesigned before total 
collapse.  The first step was rapid, thorough privatization of formerly 
state-owned entities, which set the stage for looting on an 
unprecedented scale.
2
  Privatization created miniature oligarchs that 
snatched up the majority of Russia’s wealth, and the corrupt loans-for-
shares program allowed them to turn millions into billions, almost 
overnight, skimming fortunes off the top in the process.
3
  The second 
step was a complete overhaul of the legal system,
4
 but the legacy of 
civil-law pandectic compounded the problems of privatization: the code 
had no room for broad agency principles to protect companies and 
shareholders.  The mini-oligarchs had little desire to protect 
shareholders that legitimately acquired their interests, and corruption 
and looting ran wild,
5
 due in part to the pandectic tradition’s rigid, 
micro-focused legal system that precludes any doctrine of fiduciary 
duty flexibly applied by judges.  The drafters of the new civil code 
                                                 
* Keith Marshall is a joint JD/IMBA candidate at the University of South 
Carolina School of Law and the Moore School of Business, class of 2013. He 
holds a bachelor of liberal arts in two foreign languages, German and Spanish, 
from Southern Methodist University, class of 2009. 
1 Interview with Ronald R. Childress, Adjunct Professor, Univ. of S.C. 
Sch. of Law, in Columbia, S.C. (Mar. 30, 2011) (Russians themselves have 
used this comparison to describe their situation at the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.). 
2 Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian 
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1731, 1733 (2000). 
3 Id. at 1742-23. 
4 See WILLIAM BURNHAM, PETER B. MAGGS & GENNADY M. DANILENKO, 
LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 12 (4th ed. 2009). 
5 Black, supra note 2, at 1733. 
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failed to consider the bigger picture, and, without agency principles, the 
resulting failures of corporate governance should come as no surprise. 
Part I of this paper introduces a metaphor that represents Russia’s 
lack of agency principles.  This paper then discusses the importance of 
agency principles in corporate law.  Next, the paper provides an 
overview of pandectism and introduces the lack of agency principles.  
Lastly, Part I provides a short history of Russian business forms and 
discusses the privatization of Russian business in the early 1990s.  
Part II discusses several examples of problems with Russian 
corporate governance today then focuses on one particular problem.  
Part III is the heart of this paper and discusses the lack of agency 
principles in detail.  Then, Part III analyses specific examples of the 
lack of these principles and details other examples that may be used to 
infer that the principles do not exist in Russian law.  This paper calls 
attention to a problem with Russian law and concludes that American-
style agency principles provide the best solution to this problem, 
although other solutions exist. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  RUSSIAN CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE LAW: POTEMKIN VILLAGES 
With the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(“USSR”) in 1991, the new Russia faced an economic crisis of historic 
proportions; the Soviet economy was ill-equipped to function in a 
modern world.  To this day, Russia suffers problems stemming from 
the Soviet-era and the rapid, forced transition to a market economy.  
Businesses are plagued by poor management and constant theft by 
directors.  A major cause of this is the lack of adequate corporate law, 
combined with the lack of enforcement of other laws. 
Russian law can be compared to a “Potemkin village” in that 
Russian corporate law presents a façade of adequate legal protection for 
corporations and shareholders that in reality is insufficient.  Grigory 
Alexandrovitch Potemkin rose to prominence under Empress Catherine 
II in the eighteenth century
6
 and was for seventeen years “the most 
powerful man in Russia and as such one of the most powerful men in 
Europe.”
7
  Potemkin is remembered as “one of Catherine’s many 
                                                 
6 JESSICA ALLINA-PISANO, THE POST-SOVIET POTEMKIN VILLAGE: 
POLITICS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BLACK EARTH 3 (2008). 
7 GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK, POTEMKIN: SOLIDER, STATESMAN, LOVER AND 
CONSORT OF CATHERIN OF RUSSIA xi (1st ed. 1947). 
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favorites, a particularly unsavory and extravagant character who 
bamboozled the Empress during her trip to the Crimea by putting up 
cardboard villages on the way and importing thousands of peasant serfs 
. . . to create a picture of sham prosperity.”
8
  The alleged creation of 
hollow façades of villages overshadowed the real history, and the 
phrase “Potemkin village” has come to signify a façade meant to 
impress and mislead (i.e., to hide some undesirable fact or condition).
9
  
Many Russian companies mirror Potemkin villages: although the 
companies function on the surface, many are façades for massive self-
dealing by directors and managers.  While the companies may function 
for some time, the façades eventually come crumbling down as the 
enterprises fail due to corruption and theft. 
The body of law treating corporate governance problems is itself a 
Potemkin village.  Although the Civil Code of the Russian Federation 
(“GK”), in its full pandectic glory, appears to cover all possible 
justiciable situations, a glaring problem lurks behind the façade: 
American-style agency relationships do not exist in any Russian body 
of law.  Directors do not work for the company; they are the company, 
which allows for massive fraud and corruption.
10
  Unsupported by other 
areas of the law, corporations, the public, and shareholders are 
defenseless against looting by corporate directors, whose actions on 
behalf of the corporation are not bound by agency principles.  Russian 
corporate governance has suffered greatly from this lack of proper 
defenses. 
 
B.  THE ROLE OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES IN CORPORATE LAW 
Agency principles are fundamental to American corporate law.  
The Restatement (Third) of Agency (the “Restatement”) defines agency 
as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) 
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act 
on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the 
agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”
11
  Thus, agency 
is important since companies must operate through its human 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., ALLINA-PISANO, supra note 2, at 3. 
10 See Sergey Budylin, A Comparative Study in the Law of the 
Ostensible: Apparent Agency in the U.S. and Russia, 16 CURRENTS: INT’L 
TRADE L.J. 63, 67 (Summer 2007) [hereinafter Comparative Study]. 
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
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According to the Restatement, the agent owes the principal a 
number of duties.
13
  In general, an “agent has a fiduciary duty to act 
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the 
agency relationship.”
14
  This concept is fundamental to corporate 
structure in the United States: “Because it disallows the pursuit of self-
interest as a motivating force in actions the agent determines to take on 
the principal’s behalf, compliance with the general fiduciary standard 
reduces the likelihood that an agent will not comply with the agent’s 
duties of performance.”
15
  The principles are legally binding guidelines 
to ensure that the agent, e.g., a director, acts in the best interests of the 
corporation.  When this relationship does not exist, as in Russia, 
numerous corporate governance problems arise. 
 
C.  RUSSIAN PANDECTISM 
To understand the reasoning behind the lack of American-style 
agency principles, one must first understand the nature of Russian law.  
The GK is, following the German civil code, a pandectic body of law.
16
  
Pandectism is a jurisprudential school of thought begun in the late 
nineteenth century by German scholar, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 
who painstakingly organized Roman law to create a hierarchical system 
of law, “within which every legal concept has a clearly defined 
meaning.”
17
  The purpose of such a formalistic, hierarchical code is to 
contain the entire body of law of the nation.
18
 Max Weber described a 
pandectic system as follows: 
Present-day legal science, at least in those forms 
which have achieved the highest measure of 
methodological and logical rationality, i.e. those 
                                                 
12 Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 65. 
13 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at illus. 3. 
16 See, e.g., Gábor Hamza, Continuity and Discontinuity of Private/Civil 
Law in Eastern Europe After World War II, 12 FUNDAMINA 48, 61 (2006) 
(“The new Russian Civil Code, like its predecessors, follows Pandectist 
traditions with regard to both structure and terminology.”). 
17 Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in 
Switzerland, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 301, 320 n.129 (2007). 
18 Douglas Lind, Logic, Intuition, and the Positivist Legacy of H.L.A. 
Hart, 52 SMU L. REV. 135, 138-39 (1999). 
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which have been produced through the legal science 
of the Pandectists’ Civil Law, proceeds from the 
following five postulates: viz., first, that every 
concrete legal decision be the “application” of an 
abstract legal proposition to a concrete “fact 
situation”; second, that it must be possible in every 
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract 
legal propositions by means of legal logic; third, that 
the law must actually or virtually constitute a 
“gapless” system of legal propositions, or must, at 
least, be treated as if it were such a gapless system; 
fourth, that whatever cannot be “construed” legally in 
rational terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that 
every social action of human beings must always be 
visualized as an “application” or “execution” of legal 
propositions, or as an “infringement” thereof.
19
 
In summary, a pandectic code is a theoretically complete system of 
law; thus, unlike their American counterparts, Russian courts cannot 
make law, because the law is a “logically closed system wherein right 
outcomes in adjudication were said to flow, by logical deduction, from 
the generally applicable and definitionally complete legal rules and 
principles found in the civil codes.”
20
  In other words, this system of 
law allows judges little discretion in interpreting the law;
21
 there is 
simply no such thing as a case of first impression.
22
  Thus, the lack of 
agency principles must be considered a systemic flaw, as the GK has 
not prevented corporate governance problems. 
 
D.  AGENCY, PANDECTISM, AND THE GK 
Since Russia follows the pandectist tradition of law, the GK is the 
comprehensive collection of laws, even though more specific statutes 
exist, including the Law on Joint-Stock Companies.
23
  Juridical person 
                                                 
19 MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 64 
(Edward A. Shills & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954). 
20 Lind, supra note 18, at 139. 
21 Id. 
22 See WEBER, supra note 19, at 64. 
23 Sergey Budylin, Going Beyond: The Ultra Vires Problem in Russian 
Corporate Law, 2 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 128, 129 (2008) (citations omitted). 
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 is the Russian term for “company,” although there 
are, of course, different forms, such as a corporation or limited liability 
company.  However, the problem for Russia is that American-style 
agency cannot be found in the GK or anywhere in the entire body of 
Russian law. 
As shall be discussed in the following section, the privatization of 
Russian businesses was a true shock to the system.  “When the Russian 
reformers set out . . . to create a modern market economy, . . . they were 
up against a historical legacy the full weight of which was probably 
poorly understood and the relevance of which was publicly denied.”
25
  
In other words, Russia had significant momentum in a direction that 
had little, if anything, to do with a traditional market, capitalist 
economy.
26
  The privatization program managers hoped that, “[i]f the 
general population could be turned into shareholders, they would also 
become stakeholders in making the process irreversible.”
27
  This 
solution seems like a good way to help the new market support and 
drive itself, but the full momentum of Russia’s non-capitalist history 
went unrecognized.  Following the tradition of pandectism, a 
comprehensive code of laws was promulgated,
28
 and the trust placed in 
the managers to make the system work left the GK without proper 
means to enforce shareholders’ rights.  It was like saying that agency 
principles would not be needed, because managers had to make the 




                                                 
24 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 48, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 19 (“A legal person is an 
organization that has separate property under ownership, economic 
management, or operative administration and that is liable for its obligations 
with this property and that may, in its own name, obtain and exercise property 
and personal nonproperty rights, bear duties, and be a plaintiff and defendant in 
court.”). 
25 Stefan Hedlund, Property Without Rights: Dimensions of Russian 
Privatisation, 53 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 213, 225 (2001). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 215. 
28 See BURNHAM, supra note 4, at 12-13 (4th ed. 2009). 
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E.  BRIEF HISTORY OF RUSSIAN BUSINESS FORMS & THE ERA OF 
PRIVATIZATION 
To an American, the legal and practical history of Russian 
companies would appear riddled with holes.  Corporate law in the 
United States has evolved over the years, changing through the courts 
and the legislature to meet the needs of different eras.  Corporate law in 
Russia has changed little, not benefitted by the many years of evolution 
and guidance of the courts as seen in the United States. 
Pandectism is the reason for the static nature of Russian law; 
there is simply no room for the courts to change or add to the law.  The 
pandectic tradition is plagued by a top-down approach, where the 
legislature and other ruling bodies promulgate laws that all lower courts 
and the public must follow: “Russian case law has always been an 
instrument of power in the hands of the ruler.”
29
  Laws are not created 
through a democratic process and thus are unable to be tested by lower 
courts, meaning the laws do not always “fit” in the context of the 
system as a whole.  In the United States, different corporate forms 
came into being by necessity; companies needed to operate in a 
particular way so the law evolved to meet those needs.
30
  Margaret M. 
Blair’s article, “Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century,” emphasizes this stark 
contrast and details why the corporate business forms were created:  
Entity status under the law, and the associated 
separation of governance from contribution of 
financial capital through the formation of a 
corporation, allowed corporate participants to do 
something more than engage in a series of business 
transactions, or relationships, or even projects.  It 
made it possible to build lasting institutions. 
Investments could be made in long-lived and 
specialized physical assets, in information and 
control systems, in specialized knowledge and 
routines, and in reputation and relationships, all of 
which could be sustained even as individual 
participants in the enterprise came and went.  And 
these business institutions, in turn, could accomplish 
                                                 
29 Hedlund, supra note 25, at 222. 
30 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved 
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 387-
88 (2003). 
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more toward the improvement of the wealth and 
standard of living of their participants in the long run 
than the same individuals could by holding separate 
property claims on business assets and engaging in a 
series of separate contracts with each other.
31
 
This is the epitome of legal evolution by necessity and is a far cry from 
the “evolution” in Russia.  The purpose of the newly developing 
corporate law was to allow corporations to be built from the ground up 
through the efficient accumulation of capital.
32
  This, unfortunately, 
was not possible in Russia, where the government found a sudden need 
to privatize many entities that had already been operating for years 
under state ownership.  While U.S. laws evolved enough over time to 
meet the needs of the entire country, Russian law had no time to 
evolve, as it had to meet the present demands of huge, functioning 
entities, so the pandectic model likely seemed the best approach.  
Part of the problem is Russia’s inorganic legal growth.
33
  Instead 
of allowing the law to naturally evolve, Russia grabbed laws from 
elsewhere to see if they would “grow.”
34
  “Well paid foreign 
consultants would create laws for Russia that in many cases were 
nothing but adaptations of existing German or US [sic] legislation”;
35
 
then, the USSR collapsed. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought massive, abrupt change 
to the country in the form of privatization of eventually all businesses 
that had previously been state-owned.  The privatization began with 
“voucher auctions,” during which managers gained control somewhat 
honestly but instituted rampant self-dealing, which the government 
failed to control.
36
  The later auctions proceeded with even less honesty 
and centralized power in the hands of few, “who got the funds to buy 
these companies by skimming from the government and transferred 
their skimming talents to the enterprises they acquired.”
37
  The results 
of privatization were astounding: 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 See id. 
33 Although this paper proposes that Russia needs to adopt agency laws 
similar to American agency principles, this is not to say that there should be a 
wholesale adoption; the laws need to retain their basic form yet be molded to 
the needs of Russia. 
34 Hedlund, supra note 25, at 216. 
35 Id. 
36 Black, supra note 2, at 1733. 
37 Id. 
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The largest Russian companies were sold in 
massively corrupt fashion to a handful of well-
connected men, soon dubbed “kleptocrats” by the 
Russian press . . . , who made their first centimillions 
or billions through sweetheart deals with or outright 
theft from the government, and then leveraged that 
wealth by buying major companies from the 
government for astonishingly low prices.  The 
“reformers” who promoted privatization regretted the 
corruption, but claimed that any private owner was 
better than state ownership.
38
 
Russia pursued a top-down, all-in approach to privatization, taking little 
time to consider the real implications of what was happening. 
However, Russians are not entirely at fault. So-called “shock 
therapy,”
39
 a Western theory, which entails the “rapid decontrol of 
prices, freeing of markets, and privatization of industry,” defined the 
beginning of the era of privatization.
40
  This period lasted from 1992 
until around 1995.
41
 In a country as large as Russia, which was teeming 
with companies set up by the Soviets, “shock therapy” was seen as 
simply the only way to accomplish reform.
42
  Thus, the voucher 
auctions became the vehicle of choice to accomplish the task: “Citizens 
would be given vouchers, which they could use to buy shares of 
privatized companies.”
43
  In the beginning, managers owned a majority 
of the shares, given as an incentive to not fight privatization.
44
  




Managers worked the system, often illegally, to gradually acquire 
large stakes in their companies.
46
  Since the vouchers could be traded, 
managers “illegally ‘privatiz[ed]’ company funds” to purchase 
vouchers to trade for shares.
47
  These voucher purchases were not the 
product of equal bargaining, with managers “convincing or coercing 
                                                 
38 Id. at 1736. 




43 Id. at 1740. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1741. 
47 Id. (citation omitted). 
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employees to sell their shares cheaply.”
48
  One strange feature of these 
voucher auctions further helped managers gather shares: “[I]f fewer 
vouchers were bid for a company’s shares, more shares would be 
distributed per voucher.”
49
  This led managers to devise creative ways 
to minimize the number of vouchers bid, including holding the auction 
at a difficult-to-reach location, changing the location at the last minute, 
miraculously making it impossible to travel to the set location, and 
even barring bidders from the auction with armed guards.
50
  However, 
the corruption did not go unnoticed, and the privatizers knew “that 
manager/worker control of privatized companies would limit 
shareholder oversight of managers. They saw this as an acceptable 
political price to pay for rapid privatization.”
51
  
The largest companies, including the major manufacturing, oil, 
and gas entities, were treated differently:  
[T]he government created pyramid structures, 
bundling controlling stakes in a number of operating 
companies into a few holding companies, and later 
sold controlling stakes in the holding companies . . . . 
Pyramid structures everywhere are an invitation for 
controlling shareholders to siphon wealth from 




The voucher auctions and subsequent illegal acquisition of shares 
through “trades” set the stage for rampant corruption in the corporate 
realm.  Instead of incentivizing true managerial skills, the privatizers 
unintentionally created a system in which the best managers were those 
that could most artfully grab shares. 
With the number of shares available for acquisition through 
“trade” dwindling, ever resourceful crooks devised new methods to 
steal shares, including “loans-for-shares” and blatant theft.
53
 In 1995, 
                                                 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1742. 
52 Id. at 1741. 
53 For example: “A story. The U.S. Government owes $25 billion to 
Germany. To pay off the obligation, it gives $25 billion to Bank of America 
with instructions to wire the funds to the German government. The money 
never arrives. No one ever finds out where it went, or really tries to find out. 
No one at Bank of America goes to jail. The government never asks Bank of 
America to pay the money back, and the government continues to do business 
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Vladimir Potanin proposed the “loans-for-shares” program with the 
support of the new Russian banks: “The banks proposed to loan funds 
to the government for several years, with repayment secured by the 
government’s controlling stakes in these enterprises.”
54
  Although this 
sounds like a valid plan to jump-start an ailing government, 
“[e]veryone understood that the Government would not repay the loans, 
and would instead forfeit its shares to the banks that made the loans.”
55
  
The auctions to acquire these shares were an absolute sham:  
The right to manage the auctions was parceled out 
among the major banks, who contrived to win the 
auctions that they managed at astonishingly low 
prices.  The bid rigging that was implicit in divvying 
up the auction-managing role became explicit in the 
actual bidding.  The auction manager participated in 
two separate consortia (to meet the formal 
requirement for at least two bids), each of whom bid 
the government's reservation price or trivially above 
that.  No one else bid at all.
56
 
Those that acquired these shares became the managers and directors of 
the companies at little cost, far less than fair market value.
57
  Managers 
could also acquire 30% of a firm’s shares at a discounted price with a 
written agreement with the employees of the firm that the manager 
would not allow the firm to go bankrupt for a period of one year.
58
  
This so-called agreement amounted to little more than a wink and a 
nod, meaning “this was an all-but-open gift of a controlling stake to the 
managers, in return for a phony agreement with the employees.”
59
 
                                                                                                 
with Bank of America. Indeed, the President invites Bank of America's CEO to 
become a cabinet secretary, in charge of economic reform. For a time he 
agrees, before deciding that there is more profit to be made by dealing with the 
government than by helping to run it. This story isn’t remotely possible in the 
United States. But change the bank to Oneksimbank (owned by kleptocrat 
Vladimir Potanin), run the money not through Oneksimbank itself but through 
two affiliated banks, and reduce the amount to $502 million, which is a rough 
Russian equivalent of $25 billion as a proportion of GNP, and it becomes a true 
Russian story, less widely known than it ought to be.” Id. at 1742-43. 




58 Id. at 1746. 
59 Id. (citation omitted). 
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While the foregoing practices were slowly phased out near the 
end of the era of privatization, the corruption continued unabated.  
Before privatization, “[e]nterprise directors relied heavily on the 
accumulation and use of personal connections or ‘pull,’ known 
colloquially as blat,” to keep their companies running.
60
  With the 
increasing autonomy of privatized companies, directors had to evolve 
their skills.  The massive fraud during the era of privatization allowed 
directors to acquire the majority stakes in their companies, which gave 
these directors the “opportunity to appropriate the returns to the 
relationships they had developed and cultivated under the previous 
system.”
61
  Because “[m]uch of the relational capital was both 
enterprise specific and person specific,” this meant that these directors 
had to remain with the same companies and somehow keep them 
afloat.
62
  Fortunately for the directors, the momentum of an economy 
not based on traditional notions of supply and demand meant that little 
was required of the directors in terms of managerial skills.  
Appropriation, i.e., theft, had become easy: “The director had more 
power than before; there were now fewer people to please.  The 
director could now directly appropriate the returns to investment in 
relational capital.”
63
  Unbound by the fiduciary duties of agency law, 
directors took advantage of the ailing system, and corporations 
suffered. 
 
II.  THE REALITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA TODAY 
A.  INTRODUCTION: WHAT THE LACK OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES HAS 
CAUSED 
Russia’s historically bad corporate governance trends continue; 
the corporate form itself has become a Potemkin village.  The laws 
purport to create successful business forms, but the lack of American-
style agency principles and the lack of enforcement in other areas of the 
law have allowed many businesses to become fronts for massive fraud.  
Because no agency principles are in place to differentiate directors 
from their companies, looting has become a commonplace occurrence.  
The most significant problem is a shortened managerial time horizon, 
                                                 
60 CLIFFORD G. GADDY & BARRY W. ICKES, RUSSIA’S VIRTUAL ECONOMY 
57 (2002) [hereinafter VIRTUAL ECONOMY]. 
61 Id. at 58. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 60. 
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which has disincentivized long-term goals.
64
  Without the protection of 
agency principles, companies are being forced to produce money for 
immediate use or sequestration abroad rather than ensuring stable, 
long-term growth.  
In part, this is due to the past.  The paradigm of pull has given 
way to the paradigm of looting: “Under Communist rule, a good 
manager often had to obtain the parts and supplies needed to keep a 
factory running in unofficial ways.  In a market economy, those skills 
were easily transferred to the new tasks of asset stripping and self-
dealing.”
65
  Another cause of these problems is the history and current 
form of the economy itself.  Due to necessity, the Russian economy had 
become almost exclusively a barter economy.
66
  While this barely 
worked for the Soviet Union, modern Russia cannot survive as a barter 
economy but, due to momentum, will have a difficult time becoming a 
true market economy.  
The problems today will not be solved in the next few years.  
While the goals behind the large-scale privatization of Russian 
enterprises were noble,
67
 path dependency slowed progress: 
“[T]ransformation of a rules-based programme of privatization into 
what Russians have called ‘prikhvatizatsiya’ (asset grabbing) 
represented a path dependent institutional response to the drastic 
change in rules that was implied by the collapse of the Soviet order.”
68
  
This path dependent nature is a constant struggle in Russia’s fight to 
solve its corporate governance problems. 
Scholars and lawmakers disagree about what will solve Russia’s 
problems, but the lack of American agency principles remains a 
fundamental issue.  Some argue that the problem is a lack of 
                                                 
64 Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Addiction and Withdrawal: 
Resource Rents and the Collapse of the Soviet Economy 12 (Brookings Inst. & 
Pa. State Univ., Working Paper December, 2006), available at 
http://econ.la.psu.edu/~bickes/addiction.pdf [hereinafter Addiction and 
Withdrawal]. 
65 Black, supra note 2, at 1753 (footnote omitted). 
66 See VIRTUAL ECONOMY, supra note 60, at 24 (“Throughout the 
economy, transactions were occurring where either no payment of any kind was 
made or the payment was in the form of goods rather than money.”). 
67 Hedlund, supra note 25, at 214 (The purpose of privatization is to 
improve corporate governance by “shifting power over enterprise decision 
making from the bureaucracy to the market, [and thus] enterprise management 
may be forced to improve performance.”). 
68 Id. at 213. 
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enforcement of good laws, not a lack of good laws,
69
 but this position 
places too much trust in pandectism.  While the pandectic model 
certainly may work, some overarching principles, such as agency, are 
needed to create order.  Those same scholars recognize the problems, 
without proposing a proper solution: 
We called the Russian company law that we helped 
to draft a “self-enforcing” model because we thought 
that stating sensible rules would encourage corporate 
norms to coalesce around those rules (even with 
minimal enforcement), and that the courts could 
enforce simple procedural rules (for example, 
approval of self-dealing transactions by noninterested 
[sic] shareholders).  Instead, self-dealing transactions 
were hidden, courts were of little help even when 
self-dealing was obvious, and managerial culture 
coalesced around concealing self-dealing instead of 
disclosure and a noninterested shareholder vote.
70
 
This comment belies the problems inherent with pandectism: 
attempting to create “simple” procedural laws that cover every 
justiciable situation leads to ignorance of the key principles that allow 
systems of law to function properly. 
What all of this means today is a host of problems, driven in 
significant part by the fact that corporate directors are themselves the 
company, not agents of the company.
71
  While some law exists that 
should minimize these problems,
72
 the status of the directors of a 
company as principals, not agents, cannot be ignored: there is ample 
evidence that the directors themselves are the source of the problems in 
Russia today. 
                                                 
69 Black, supra note 2, at 1755 (footnote omitted) (“Russia’s core 
problem today is less lack of decent laws than lack of the infrastructure and 
political will to enforce them. For example, the company law prohibits much of 
the rampant self-dealing by managers and large shareholders that occurs every 
day. But the courts respect only documentary evidence, which is rarely 
available given limited discovery and managers’ skill in covering their 
tracks.”). 
70 Id. at 1756 (footnote omitted). 
71 Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 65. 
72 See, e.g., GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] 
[Civil Code] art. 103, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION, http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last November 5, 2011) 
(This article gives the stockholders general powers over the company, such as 
the approval of accounting documents.). 
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B.  THE SHORT TIME HORIZON: POOR MANAGEMENT, LOOTING, 
CORRUPTION, AND SELF-DEALING 
The short managerial time horizon of many corporate directors is 
a major problem today because it skews focus and rewards looting, 
corruption, and self-dealing.  In the transition from the Soviet economy 
to a forced market economy, the paradigm became “take the money and 
run.”  This happened almost by laziness: when actual production of 
wealth was centered on natural resources, “resource addiction” to oil 
and gas created major problems when booms ended and rents 
decreased.
73
  “[A]ddiction leads to short-time horizon—inability to 
think long-term. . . . This leads to an inability to implement reforms.”
74
  
When the era of privatization left the oil and gas rents in the hands of a 
small number of people, the rest of the country’s directors were left 
with two options that persist to this day: steal from the company or 




Theft became the easiest option for those managing the company.  
Since directors and officers are the company, they can actively steal, 
and courts will not enforce the existing laws that purport to protect 
corporations and shareholders.
76
  Directors “were expert[s] at [looting]; 
and it was sure to produce a handsome profit that could be tucked away 
overseas beyond the reach of a future Russian government.”
77
  The 
effect snowballed: 
[M]any managers who started out honest changed 
their minds, because they saw what their fellow 
managers were able to get away with; the tax system 
demanded that profits be hidden (which made them 
easy to steal); they saw the Mafia and dishonest 
managers becoming wealthy while they struggled to 
                                                 
73 Addiction and Withdrawal, supra note 64, at 2. 
74 Id. at 12. 
75 Black, supra note 2, at 1736. 
76 Id. at 1756. 
77 Id. (For example, “Bank Menatep (controlled by kleptocrat Mikhail 
Khodorkovski) acquired Yukos, a major Russian oil holding company, in 1995. 
For 1996, Yukos’ financial statements show revenue of $8.60 per barrel of 
oil—about $4 per barrel less than it should have been. Khodorkovski skimmed 
over 30 cents per dollar of revenue while stiffing his workers on wages, 
defaulting on tax payments, destroying the value of minority shares in Yukos 
and its production subsidiaries, and not reinvesting in Yukos’ oil fields.” Id. at 
1736-37 (footnote omitted)). 
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survive; and the authorities were too corrupt to do 
anything about obvious theft.  Others, discouraged by 
the hostile business environment, sold out to crooks 
who could earn a swift return on investment in ways 
that honest managers couldn’t.  Honest and dishonest 




This is where Russia sits today, stuck in an equilibrium that 
incentivizes theft and corruption, because the law is either incomplete 
or unenforced. 
In the United States, one way for a company to thrive is to please 
shareholders by maximizing profit.  The reward for profit maximization 
comes in the form of approval of a higher salary.  The U.S. system is 
not perfect, but such widespread corruption also does not exist likely 
due to its system of “true” agency.  
The primary goal of Russian directors differs greatly: “do not 
make a profit that can be observed.”
79
  This may be counterintuitive to 
Americans, but this method allows the company to shelter its earnings 
from high taxation.
80
  The problem is that it also allows directors to 
steal from the company without authorities or shareholders noticing.
81
 
This is not to say that continuous theft is possible.  “Suppliers and 
employees can’t be defrauded indefinitely, even if they have no legal 
recourse.  Sooner or later, they will stop doing business with the 
firm.”
82
  Thus, the current iteration of a looting scheme involves a 
mixture of profit maximization and theft of the firm’s value.
83
  One 
might ask why the market would not trend more towards profit 
maximization; but, this assumes that the managers in charge have the 
requisite skill, and the uncertain future of the market makes actual 
profit maximization more challenging.  Possible future sanctions 
further complicate the situation:  
Thieves who will be caught if they linger too long 
won’t capture the firm’s long-term value anyway. An 
amoral [director] then has a sharp choice: create 
value (perhaps with self-dealing at a level unlikely to 
                                                 
78 Id. at 1767 (footnote omitted). 
79 VIRTUAL ECONOMY, supra note 60, at 67. 
80 Id. at 66. 
81 Black, supra note 2, at 1767. 
82 Id. at 1751. 
83 Id. at 1752. 
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lead to sanctions), or steal as much as you can and 
then flee the jurisdiction.
84
  
Two important factors for the short time horizon are economic and 
political uncertainty;
85
 a future government could choose to enforce the 
rules or might even add American agency principles.  This increases 
the challenge of profit maximization, which, in turn, increases the 
incentive to steal in the short run.  Poor management skills compound 
all of these problems.
86
 
This system can be taxing, both literally and figuratively, so 
shareholders end up with little of the company’s value and have few 
means to effect change.  Informal taxes are a major hindrance to proper 
allocation of capital between the firm, its management, and its 
shareholders.
87
  Bribes constitute a major portion of lost profits, as 
bribes must go “to tax inspectors, to customs officials, to the police not 
to harass you, to the many bureaucrats from whom you need a permit to 
operate,” etc.
88
  The past few years have changed little; Putin 
transformed “the previous rent-sharing schemes into a single, centrally 
run scheme . . .—requiring constant investments by oligarchs to protect 
property rights.”
89
  For example, the oil stabilization fund should 
overflow with profits, yet it received only 14 percent of the total 
rents.
90
 The rest “is distributed throughout the economy in other forms 
to different claimants.  The owners of the resource companies—the 
oligarchs—keep a healthy amount as profits.”
91
 This is the definition of 
looting, and agency principles should prevent this self-dealing and 
stabilize the market. 
                                                 
84 Id. at 1751. 
85 Id. at 1765. 
86 Id. at 1764. 
87 This includes “(1) bribes paid to government officials; and (2) 
payments made for the support of public sector needs that are nominally 
voluntary but in fact mandatory for businesses, for example, payments made by 
enterprises to support the social sector of towns and regions, cultural programs, 
philanthropic giving, and so on.” CLIFFORD G. GADDY & BARRY W. ICKES, THE 
VIRTUAL ECONOMY REVISITED: RESOURCE RENTS AND THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 3 
(2006) [hereinafter VIRTUAL ECONOMY REVISITED]. 
88 Black, supra note 2, at 1759 (footnote omitted). 
89 VIRTUAL ECONOMY REVISITED, supra note 87, at 4. 
90 Clifford G. Gaddy, The Russian Economy in the Year 2006, 23 POST-
SOVIET AFF. 38, 40 (2007). 
91 Id. 
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There is ample documentation of the problems surrounding 
Russian corporate governance.  This paper indicates a major source of 
the problems but barely scratches the surface in terms of hard evidence.  
While the lack of agency principles is certainly not the only cause of 
the problems in Russia today, it is a significant cause nonetheless.  The 
lack of agency principles manifests itself in a number of ways; the short 
time horizon is one major issue that must be overcome, because it is the 
basis for other issues, specifically looting and self-dealing. 
 
III.  RUSSIA’S LACK OF AMERICAN-STYLE AGENCY PRINCIPLES 
A.  AGENCY PRINCIPLES CANNOT BE FOUND IN RUSSIAN LAW 
Unlike the codes of the United States or any state, the GK lacks 
principles that are truly similar to agency law.  Further, U.S. corporate 
law differs from Russian corporate law in a significant way: “the CEO 
of a Russian company (also known as [a] director . . . ) is not normally 
viewed as a representative or agent of the company; rather he is a 
company’s ‘governing body’ controlled by corporate law.”
92
  Thus, 
managers aren’t working for the company as agents; they are the 
company (principals)—this is the main difference between American 
and Russian corporate law.  If an agent is supposed to “act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control,”
93
 what 
happens when the person acting for the corporation is not acting on 
anyone else’s behalf and is not subject to anyone else’s control?  The 
director becomes a miniature oligarch of his or her organization, which 
allows, and even incentivizes, theft from the company.  For example, 
the Restatement states that an “agent has a duty . . . not to use property 
of the principal for the agent’s own purposes.”
94
  The lack of this 
fundamental doctrine in the GK could create serious problems, for 
example, if other principles were not enforced. 
                                                 
92 Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 67; see also Federal’nyi Zakon 
RF ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh [Federal Law of the Russian Federation 
on Joint Stock Companies], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI 
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 1996, No. 1, Item 1, art. 69, translated in WILLIAM E. 
BUTLER, RUSSIAN COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION 277 (2003) (“A 
one-man executive organ of a society (director, director-general) shall operate 
in the name of the society without a power of attorney, including represent its 
interests, conclude transactions in the name of the society, confirm the 
personnel establishment, and issue orders and give instructions binding for 
execution by all workers of the society.”). 
93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
94 Id. § 8.05. 
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Consider another example: Russian directors often act with 
reckless disregard for the best interests of the company, knowing that 
their time to make (i.e. steal) money is limited.  The existence of 
agency principles would set up a standard of care to prevent this from 
happening.  “[A]n agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, 
competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar 
circumstances.”
95
  Someone familiar with Russian corporate 
governance practice might note that the standard of care is in fact theft, 
so this provision would have to be adapted to the unique status of the 
Russian corporate environment. The Restatement further provides that:  
An agent has a duty, subject to any agreement with 
the principal, (1) not to deal with the principal’s 
property so that it appears to be the agent’s property; 
(2) not to mingle the principal’s property with anyone 
else’s; and (3) to keep and render accounts to the 
principal of money or other property received or paid 
out on the principal’s account.
96
  
This further reinforces the commitment to preventing theft from the 
company, but this concept is only possible under true agency.  This 
cannot work in Russia, because a director cannot be distinguished from 
the principal. 
The Russian pandectist will counter that there are laws that cover 
these very situations, but the problem with this argument is that the 
laws that protect shareholders are not enforced or are too weak.
97
  This 
is where agency principles should help to limit the ability of directors 
to harm the corporation and its shareholders.  This is not related to 
apparent agency or ultra vires actions—the issue is the director himself 
or herself as an agent of the corporation.  The American lawyer will 
then ask the pandectist where he or she can find principles that link 
directors to the corporation through agency.  The pandectist might point 
to a number of provisions, but these provisions only look like, but are 
not in reality, agency.  Through global research, I found no link 
between Russian corporate directors and agency.  Similarly, the 
personal research of Ronald M. Childress,
98
 which entailed a systematic 
                                                 
95 Id. § 8.08. 
96 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.12 (2006). 
97 Black, supra note 2, at 1756. 
98 Ronald M. Childress is a University of South Carolina School of Law 
professor and former director of Project ROSCON and the Rule of Law 
Consortium in Moscow. 
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review of Russian Supreme Court and Supreme Commercial Court 
explanations (“rulings” (postanovleniia) or “informational letters”),
99
 
revealed only a limited number of pronouncements that could even 
remotely be compared to American paradigms. 
The American lawyer may then ask himself or herself whether the 
lack of agency principles is actually a problem.  The pandectist would 
deny that a problem exists, but the problem may be seen with a quick 
reflection on the basic tenets of pandectism.  Because agency principles 
are not found in the GK, judges will not read them into the law, which 
American judges often do, inventing entire bodies of law not found in 
any statute, ordinance, etc.  Russian judges will not even recognize the 
existence of agency principles as we know them—there is not even a 
proper Russian word for agency in the GK.  To a pandectist, this is not 
a problem, because the GK theoretically covers all possible justiciable 
situations.  Only the Federal Assembly—the Russian legislature, with 
the Duma as the primary entity—really “defines” what can be an issue 
or problem before the courts, because courts will only consider issues if 
they fit the narrow definitions found in the codes.
100
  
Since other portions of the GK and portions of the applicable 
corporate laws are either not enforced or are too weak to support a 
healthy corporate environment, the lack of agency principles is a direct 
cause of the problems with corporate governance.  The problem is 
circular: because agency principles are not in the GK, courts will not 
recognize them; but, because courts will not recognize and create them, 
the problem cannot be solved.  And, since it is unlikely that courts will 
undergo a true paradigm shift away from pandectism, the best solution 
will be for the legislature to rewrite the laws to include agency 
principles to protect shareholders.  
The problem for American lawyers trying to understand this 
system is that we want a real answer: a “yes” or “no,” followed by a 
“because,” such as a court saying “we do not recognize American 
agency principles, because our system provides adequate protection for 
shareholders.”  But, the closest thing an American lawyer can get to an 
answer is something like the informational letter and ruling discussed 
below, where the court circles around the topic, never actually 
                                                 
99 See BURNHAM, supra note 4, at 22 (“The purpose of explanations is to 
authoritatively interpret the law and instruct the entire court system concerning 
its application. Explanations are addressed directly to the lower courts and 
often instruct them to interpret and to apply specific rules of law in a specific 
matter.”). 
100 Id. at 9. 
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mentioning or disclaiming agency.  Therefore, this behavior is our “no” 
to the question of whether agency principles exist and is also a “yes” to 
the question of whether there really is a problem, because, as was 
shown in Part II, the problems today are significant and numerous. 
 
B.  EVIDENCE OF THE LACK OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES 
Although the explanations do not actually mention a lack of 
agency, the discussions and principles behind them may be used to 
infer that agency principles do not exist.  One informational letter, 
Number 144 (18 January 2011), of the RF Supreme Commercial 
[Arbitrazh] Court discussed “the presentation of information upon 
demand by participants in limited liability companies and by 
stockholders”
101
—a concept American lawyers know as shareholder 
inspection rights.  In the context of inspection of corporate records, the 
basic agency premise is that inspection rights exist to protect the 
shareholders, the owners of the company, by allowing them to monitor 
the directors, the agents of the corporation.
102
  This informational letter 
supports the proposition that true agency principles do not exist in 
Russian law.  Without agents, as the term is used in the United States, 
there is no need to provide thorough inspection rights, because there is 
no one from whom the shareholders must be protected.  Further, 
transparency of a company is limited, meaning the mini-oligarch 
directors are able to hide more from investors/participants, thus making 
it easier to steal.  
The informational letter states that, in “accord with Article 91(1) 
paragraph one of the Joint Stock Company statute, stockholders (a 
stockholder) holding no less than twenty-five percent of company 
                                                 
101 Informatsionnoe Pis’mo Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF 
“O nekotorykh voprosakh praktiki rassmotreniya arbitrazhnymi sudami sporov 
o predostavlenii informatsii uchastnikam khozyaystvennykh obchestv” [The 
Highest Commercial Court of the Russian Federation Informational Letter on 
Several Questions of Practice in Commercial Court Consideration of Disputes 
On Presenting Information to Participants in Commercial Companies], VESTNIK 
VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA RF [VESTN. VAS] [The Highest Commercial 
Court of the RF Reporter] 2011, No. 144 [hereinafter Informational Letter]. 
102 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905) (citing Cincinnati 
Volkablatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189-201, 48 L. R. 732, 78 Am. St. 
Rep. 707, 56 N.E. 1033 (1990)) (“The right of inspection rests upon the 
proposition that those in charge of the corporation are merely the agents of the 
stockholders who are the real owners of the property.”). 
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voting shares have a right of access to accounting documents.”
103
  This 
shows just how weak shareholder inspection rights are: to inspect 
corporate records, one must own at least twenty-five percent of the 
company.  Even combined, shareholders cannot access the information, 
unless at least one shareholder in the group has the requisite twenty-
five percent.
104
  This would be considered ludicrous in the United 
States.  In Delaware, “[a]ny stockholder . . . shall, upon written demand 
under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right . . . to inspect for 
any proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from: (1) The 
corporation’s stock ledger, . . . and its other books and records.”
105
  
A shareholder may not even find out who can participate in the 
stockholders general meeting, unless he or she owns at least one 
percent of the company:  
[T]he list of persons having the right to participate in 
the stockholders general meeting shall be presented 
by the company for familiarization upon demand of 
persons included on the list and possessing no less 
than one percent of the votes. . . .  In connection with 
this, stockholders not included on the list or not 
possessing more than one percent of the votes in the 
aggregate, do not have the right to demand 
presentation to them of such list . . . .
106
 
Imagine if this were the case in the United States for a large company 
with a market capitalization of, e.g., $150 billion: a shareholder would 
have to own at least $1.5 Billion worth of shares, just to see who is 
accountable for the important decisions made at the shareholders 
general meeting.  Thus, for large companies in Russia, this is a 
significant barrier to shareholders trying to monitor the company’s 
performance.  The corresponding provision of the Delaware Code 
reads: “Such list shall be open to the examination of any stockholder 
for any purpose germane to the meeting.”
107
  As the U.S. Supreme 
                                                 
103 Informational Letter, supra note 101, ¶ 17. 
104 Id. (“Besides this, court should keep in mind that in a case when a 
stockholder, having less than twenty-five percent of company voting shares, 
has applied to court with a claim to compel a joint stock company to present 
documents of account reporting and/or their copies, his claim is not subject to 
being satisfied even if this stockholder has earlier applied to the company with 
an appropriate demand together with other stockholders and the aggregate share 
[is] no less than twenty-five percent of company voting shares.”). 
105 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010) (emphasis added).  
106 Informational Letter, supra note 101, ¶ 19. 
107 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (West 2009). 
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Court stated in Guthrie v. Harkness, shareholder inspection rights are 
grounded in agency principles,
108
 so the lack here of proper inspection 
rights is evidence that agency principles do not exist in Russia. 
On April 2, 1997, the RF Supreme Court Plenum and RF Supreme 
Commercial Court Plenum set forth ruling number 4/8, “On Some 
Questions in Applying the Federal Statute on Joint Stock 
Companies.”
109
  The court stated: 
A decision by the board of directors (board of 
overseers) or executive agency of the joint stock 
company (individually or collectively) may be 
disputed in a judicial proceeding by presenting a law 
suit to deem it invalid as in cases when the possibility 
of [such] dispute is contemplated in the statute 
(Article 53, 55 and others), as in the absence of an 
appropriate directive, [or] if the decision does not 
meet the requirements of the statute and other 
normative law acts and violates stockholder rights 
and statutorily protected interests. The defendant in 
such case is the joint stock company.
110
 
In the United States, this is known as a shareholder derivative suit and 
is based on agency principles.
111
  Normally, such a suit alleges that the 
directors or officers violated their fiduciary duties to the company.
112
 
This did not transpire in the Russian court. In this ruling, the courts 
defined a concept, very common and fluid in the United States, in 
                                                 
108 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905). 
109 Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF i Vestnik Vysshego 
Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF “O nekotorykh voprosakh primeneniya federal’nogo 
zakona ‘Ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh’” ot 2 aprelya 1997 g. [The Russian 
Federation Supreme Court and Supreme Commercial Court [Joint] Plenary 
Ruling on Some Questions in Applying the Federal Statute on Joint Stock 
Companies of Apr. 2, 1997], BIULLETEN’ VERKHOVNOGO SUDA RF [BVS] 
[Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 1998, No. 3/5 
[hereinafter Ruling on Joint Stock Companies]. 
110 Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis in original). 
111 Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate 
Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding 
Filings, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 144 (2007) (“In a derivative 
lawsuit, the plaintiff shareholders theoretically act in the interests of all 
shareholders, thus employing a legal mechanism to address agency problems 
that exist between shareholders and management.”). 
112 Id. at 145. 
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extremely static terms: the suit can only be brought if specifically 
contemplated by statute, in the absence of appropriate directive, or “if 
the decision does not meet the requirements of the statute and other 
normative law acts and violates stockholder rights and statutorily 
protected interests.”
113
  This ruling stems from the pandectic nature of 
Russian law.  The court is not willing to allow any fluidity in the law, 
which would have bolstered shareholders’ rights.  The last part reduces 
our idea of violations of shareholders’ rights, an agency issue, to a 
basic statutory violation.  This compounds the problem, because these 
very laws are not enforced by the courts.  Thus, shareholders have 
almost no chance of vindicating their rights, unless the law specifically 
mentions what can be challenged if allegedly violated. 
Ruling 4/8 supports the proposition that agency principles do not 
exist.  By limiting the situations where shareholders may institute 
derivative suits, the court is saying that there are limited situations 
where directors or officers have done something wrong.  In the United 
States, this involves violations of fiduciary duty principles, a subset of 
agency.
114
  Because the Russian directors are the corporation, they are 
not independent persons that can be sued on behalf of the corporation 
for wrongful acts.  Thus, the mechanism to solve agency problems is 
limited simply because it is not needed under the law.  Shareholder 
derivative suits are not needed if it cannot be recognized that the 
directors violated some duty. 
The informational letter and ruling exhibit a common theme: 
shareholders have few rights to inspect and question the actions of the 
corporation.  The informational letter showed that there is a high bar to 
inspect corporate records, and the ruling showed that only in narrow 
circumstances may shareholders challenge actions of the board or other 
executives.  The second plays off of the first: to know something is 
truly wrong, shareholders must inspect the corporate records, meaning 
there is, at the least, a two-step bar to the vindication of rights.  This is 
real evidence of a lack of agency principles, despite the fact that both 
the informational letter and the ruling failed to mention agency in any 
form.  With few shareholder checks on their power, directors have been 
able to exploit the companies for which they work, stealing billions in 
the process. 
 
                                                 
113 Ruling on Joint Stock Companies, supra note 109, ¶ 10. 
114 Ferris, supra note 111, at 144. 
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C.  SIMILARITIES TO AMERICAN AGENCY PRINCIPLES AS EVIDENCE OF THE 
LACK THEREOF 
A number of passages in the GK resemble the American agency 
concepts of principal and agent or govern situations that would, in the 
American paradigm, require application of agency principles.  
“Representation” seems to be of the same mold as the concept of a 
principal and agent relationship;
115
 however, it is much narrower and is 
different as applied.
116
  Like a Potemkin village, “representation” 
purports to be agency but is without any substance to truly make it 
agency. GK Chapter 10, Article 182 reads:  
A transaction made by one person (a representative) 
in the name of another person (the person 
represented) by virtue of a power based upon a power 
of attorney, a provision of a statute or an act of a state 
agency of local self-government empowered thereto 
directly creates, changes, or terminates the civil law 
rights and duties of the person represented.
117
 
“Power of attorney” is a common translation, meaning this article 
applies most often in the context of the attorney-client relationship.
118
  
The concept of “representation” is a much more static representation of 
legal rights, not dynamic like our system.  For example, Chapter 10, 
Article 185 requires that the “power of attorney” be a “written 
authorization issued by one person to another person for representation 
before third persons.”
119
  Thus, “representation” is really a transaction, 
or occurrence-specific contract, which differs greatly from our 
principal-agent relationship. 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] 
[Civil Code] art. 182, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR 
AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 75. 
116 Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 66. 
117 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 182, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 75. 
118 Id. 
119 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 185, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 76. 
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One might argue that a director could be considered a 
representative under the last sentence of Article 182, which states that 
this authority “may also arise from the circumstances in which the 
representative (salesperson in retail trade, cashier, etc.) acts.”
120
  
However, “while the Civil Code leaves open the list of cases where 
authority may be inferred from a situation, in fact the above-mentioned 
cases (a salesman and a cashier) are practically the only instances 
where such ‘inferred’ or ‘implied’ authority is recognized.”
121
  Russian 
courts, unwilling to stray from the pandectic model, will likely not hold 
that a director is a representative.  Ruling that a director is a 
representative of the company would in fact be a major change for 
Russian corporate law, because Chapter 10, Article 186 states that the 
“term of a power of attorney may not exceed three years.”
122
  Thus, 
directors and officers would be required to sign new employment 
contracts every three years for this provision to work like agency.  
Further, only directors, and perhaps officers, may sign a power of 
attorney on behalf of a company, meaning directors and officers could 
not themselves be representatives.
123
  This strengthens the proposition 
that agency principles do not exist, because under the concept that most 
closely resembles agency, a director cannot be a representative; thus, 
the director certainly cannot be an agent. 
Another problem is the means to challenge a power of attorney.  
Article 189 of Chapter 10 states that only the grantor of the power of 
                                                 
120 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] 
[Civil Code] art. 182, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR 
AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 75. 
121 Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 66. 
122 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 186, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 76. 
123 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 185, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 76 (“A power of attorney in the 
name of a legal person shall be issued under the signature of its manager or 
other person authorized for this by the founding documents, with an attachment 
of the seal of this organization.”). This provision might even strengthen the 
need for agency relationships, because, theoretically, a director could assign 
himself a “power of attorney” saying that the company would transfer all of its 
assets to him. Thorough research has revealed no examples of this actually 
occurring, but it is certainly possible. 
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attorney can challenge the transaction.
124
  But, would a company 
challenge the actions of a director in granting the power of attorney?  
The answer is likely no, especially since the rights of shareholders to 
institute derivative suits are very weak. 
Several articles of Chapter 25 of the GK mimic another American 
agency concept, respondeat superior.  According to the Restatement, 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an “employer is subject to 
liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the 
scope of their employment.”
125
  However, respondeat superior “is 
inapplicable when a principal does not have the right to control the 
actions of the agent that makes the relationship between principal and 
agent performing the service one of employment.”
126
  Thus, this 
American doctrine presumes that the employee is in fact an agent and 
encompasses all acts that might occur during employment.  
Chapter 25, Article 402, states the Russian equivalent in terms of 
“obligations”: “Actions of employees of the debtor in performance of 
its obligation shall be considered to be actions of the debtor.”
127
  An 
“obligation” is when “one person (the debtor) is obligated to take for 
the use of another person (the creditor) a defined action.”
128
  Although 
this appears very similar to respondeat superior, the Russian version is 
much narrower and does not truly contemplate an agency relationship.  
The liability of an employee arises here with regard to a specific 
transaction or occurrence and does not reflect the ongoing employment 
status.  True American-style agency would be the adoption of liability 
throughout the ongoing employment status, but this provision is limited 
to one specific instance.
129
  The problem is that the employee owes no 
                                                 
124 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 185, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct.- Sept. 1996 at 78. 
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
126 Id. at cmt. b. 
127 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 402, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 6, Nov. - Dec. 1996 at 63. 
128 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 307, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS 
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 6, Nov. - Dec. 1996 at 35. 
129 It should be noted that the RF Labor Code (TK) governs employment 
law-relationships, so the theory of ongoing respondeat superior is governed by 
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duties outside the context of the particular transaction, meaning the link 
to American agency principles is weak.  The essential difference from 
American agency principles is that the Russian approach is static and 
mechanistic. 
Another instance in which Russian law differs from American 
agency principles is Chapter 49, the title of which is often translated as 
“Commission”
130
 and sometimes translated as “Agency.”
131
 Article 971 
states: 
1. Under the [commission] one party (agent) shall 
undertake to perform certain legal actions on behalf 
and at the expense of the other party (principal). The 
rights and obligations under the transaction 
completed by the agent shall accrue directly for the 
principal. 
2. A [commission] may be concluded with reference 
to the period during which the agent has the right to 




This seems to be the perfect setup for concepts similar to American 
agency principles, so one would think that the rest of the Chapter 
actually contained agency principles, but it falls short.  First, “agent” is 
sometimes translated as “attorney,”
133
 which shows how narrow this 
Chapter might truly be; this would conform to the pandectic goal of 
specificity.  “Agent” is not likely the proper translation,
134
 so this 
Chapter could not actually match American agency principles. 
                                                                                                 
an entirely different body of law. Further, my research revealed no provisions 
of the RF TK that might support the proposition that American agency 
principles exist, albeit outside the RF GK. 
130 See, e.g., GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] 
[Civil Code] ch. 49, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL 
LEGISLATION 465 (1999). 
131 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
ch. 49, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
132 Id. § 971 (“contract of agency” changed to “commission,” which is 
likely a better translation). 
133 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 972, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL LEGISLATION 466 
(1999). 
134 For example, another translation uses the word “delegate” instead of 
agent. By avoiding the word “agent,” most translations seem to be implying 
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Second, even if “agency” is the proper translation, the duties 
mentioned in Article 974 do not establish any duties similar to those of 
American agency principles: 
The agent [is required]: to perform the [commission] 
given to him in person, . . . ; to communicate to the 
principal all information about the progress of the 
execution of [commission] at his request; to convey 
to the principal without delay all the things received 
under the transactions, performed in pursuance of the 
[commission]; to return without delay to the principal 
the [power of attorney] whose validity term has, not 
expired upon the execution of [commission] or in 
case of the termination of the [commission] before it 
is executed and to submit a report with appended 
covering documents, if this is required by the terms 




None of these duties include any sort of fiduciary duty, so, even 
assuming that this Chapter could apply to company directors in the 
form of agency, it would be useless to solve the corporate governance 
problems. 
 Although Chapter 49 likely relates to attorneys and power of 
attorney, Chapter 51, titled “Commission”
136
 or “Commission 
Agency,”
137
 is similar to American agency in that it presupposes the 
                                                                                                 
that this is not agency in the American sense. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 48, translated in Peter B. 
Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & 
DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 
1996 at 328. 
135 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 974, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011) (several words 
or phrases replaced with better translations). 
136 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
ch. 51, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
137 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
ch. 51, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL LEGISLATION 473 
(1999) (the title of this chapter might simply contain “Agency” to differentiate 
it from Chapter 49, which the author titles “Commission,” meaning “Agency” 
might not be meant to parallel the American term). 
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ability of an “agent” to make purchases.  However, this Chapter more 
closely mirrors contract law regarding the sale of goods; for example, it 
mentions the ramifications of incomplete performance,
138
 failure or 
refusal to perform,
139
 etc.  It should also be noted that nowhere does 
Chapter 51 mention power of attorney.  These concepts are a formulaic 
approach to contract law, with no place for an agency concept like 
fiduciary duty.  This Chapter also fails to rise to the level of American 
agency principles in that no real duties are mentioned. Chapter 52 
follows a similar pattern.
140
 
The title of Chapter 52, Article 1005 is often translated as 
“Agency Contract.”
141
  This article deals with what Americans would 
call an “undisclosed principal” and “disclosed principal.”
142
  While this 
might be a slight incorporation of American agency principles, there is 
certainly no fundamental incorporation of agency law.
143
  The contract 
is far narrower than in the United States and cannot pertain to directors 
of a company, because the principal may not be a juridical person.  
Thus, while adopting a feature similar to American agency principles, 
Article 1005 is not in fact “true agency.”  It should also be noted that 
this article might pertain specifically to the shipping industry and have 
less in common with broad agency principles.
144
  This would fit the 
specificity goal of pandectism.  The title of Chapter 52 is sometimes 
translated as “Agency Service”
145
 or “Shipping Agency Service,”
146
 
and the title of Article 1005 is sometimes translated as “The Brokerage 
                                                 
138 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 995, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
139 Id. § 1004. 
140 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
ch. 52, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
141 See, e.g., Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 65. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil 
Code] art. 1005, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011); see also 
Агентирование, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/#ru|en| 
Агентирование (last visited July 14, 2011). 
145 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
ch. 52, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
146 Агентирование, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/#ru| 
en|Агентирование (last visited July 14, 2011). 
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  Although these translations are not dispositive and no 
other supporting references could be found, this chapter might deal 
exclusively with shipping and, if not, is still not a true incorporation of 
agency principles. 
While Chapter 4 details what American attorneys would think of 
as normal partnerships, Chapter 55 covers a “simple partnership.”
148
  
The simple partnership allows several people to pursue profit or some 
other legal purpose jointly without forming a juridical person.
149
  This 
Chapter comes very close to exhibiting principles similar to American 
agency principles but also falls short.  For example, Article 1043 states 
that the “obligations of the partners to maintain their common property 
and the procedure for the reimbursement of expenses relating to the 
discharge of these obligations shall be determined by the contract of 
[simple] partnership.”
150
  This seems to say that partners, as agents of 
the partnership, owe the other partners fiduciary duties.  However, 
instead of creating an agency relationship, this article turns a potential 
fiduciary duty into a contract right that shall only exist if specifically 
included by the partners in their contract.
151
  Article 1045 even appears 
to support the proposition that this Chapter is similar to agency: it 
provides that all partners have rights of inspection of the partnership’s 
documents.
152
  As previously discussed, the relationship between 
agency principles and shareholder inspection rights is that the 
inspection rights exist to protect the shareholders, by allowing them to 
monitor the directors (agents).
153
  Thus, by allowing all partners to 
                                                 
147 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 1005, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
148 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
ch. 55, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL LEGISLATION 499 
(1999). 
149 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 1041, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
150 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 1043, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
151 Id. 
152 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 1045, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011). 
153 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905) (“The right of 
inspection rests upon the proposition that those in charge of the corporation are 
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inspect the records of the partnership, the GK seems to imply that 
agency principles exist in some form.  However, the implication is lost 
on the rest of the Chapter, as no real duties are created. 
 In summary, while a number of articles in the GK appear to be or 
come close to being American-style agency principles, the code lacks 
true agency principles.  This does not mean that the GK completely 
ignores agency; to the contrary, the articles discussed above might 
show that the drafters of the Code recognized agency principles, but 
purposefully chose not to include such broad concepts.  Thus, the 
provisions that are similar to agency reinforce the proposition that real 
agency principles do not exist in Russian law.  Why would such 
overarching principles be needed when the pandectic model of this 
code should account for all possible justiciable situations?  The answer 
is that they technically would not be needed, but this answer fails to 
recognize the real, practical problems caused by this lack of agency.  
The failure lies with the inherent problems in creating a pandectic code 
of laws from scratch, where the prevailing practices in the preceding 
years differed so greatly.  The drafters, even with help from abroad, 
were simply not equipped to create the necessary code of laws.  The 
problem persists today because Russia has become so entrenched in the 
pandectic model.  The greater problem is what was shown in Part II: 
the lack of agency principles has transcended legal and scholastic 
bounds and has caused real life problems. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 This paper should not be read to infer that the drafters of the GK 
intended to deprive shareholders of their rights, as this is not the case.  
The drafters had good intentions, but, with the micro-level focus of 
pandectism, they missed the macro-level protection offered by agency 
principles.  
So, what happens next? A number of important questions remain. 
What will happen in the future? How can the existing problems be 
solved?  Are individual directors at fault, or should we blame history?  
How can Russia be taken off its current path, which likely will lead to 
self-destruction of the corporate structure as a whole?  
The overall solution might be a continuation of the pandectic 
theme, i.e., a top-down approach: “For both already privatized and not-
                                                                                                 
merely the agents of the stockholders who are the real owners of the 
property.”). 
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yet-privatized firms, Russia needs a serious, top-down effort to control 
corruption, organized crime, and self-dealing.”
154
  Although a number 
of scholars hold this view, the answer is not so simple.  One possible 
solution to fix corporate governance issues is twofold: 1) adopt 
American agency principles, and 2) strengthen the requirements of 
founding documents so that directors cannot escape liability.  This 
remains an oversimplification though.  Massive reform is needed.  In 
addition to the foregoing, Russia needs better measures to counteract 
corruption and self-dealing, perhaps through new tax or corporate laws 
to disincentivize self-dealing through strong penalties. 
Although other solutions may exist, the adoption of American 
agency principles could prove to be the easiest, most effective solution.  
Simple procedural laws have failed; despite provisions against self-
dealing, courts consistently refuse to hold directors liable.  Perhaps 
broader, thematic provisions are needed that would rewrite the role 
corporate directors play.  Agency principles could even take the form 
of constitutional laws, which could aid enforcement. 
These problems raise the broader issue of the desirability of 
pandectism in general.  Some of the corporate governance problems 
today might be caused in part by the nature of a pandectic code: it 
might simply be more difficult to litigate under such a comprehensive 
code than under a system like the United States.  The difficulty of 
litigation might manifest itself in lower success rates of those trying to 
challenge companies but lacking the resources a company has to defend 
itself.  Similarly, this difficulty might deter litigation altogether due to 
the complexity of the code and number of provisions that must first be 
followed.  The basic pandectic concept of trying to cover all possible 
justiciable situations might have created a monster that defies all but 
the mightiest challenger. 
However, Russia will not likely stray from pandectism in the near 
future—this would be a major paradigm shift, therefore, the Potemkin 
village of corporate law must be dismantled and rebuilt as a whole 
“village.”  Current laws allow for the creation of a façade: companies 
appear to be functioning, but, behind the wall, directors are skimming 
profits until the company fails.  History cannot be ignored though, and 
it must be recognized that the current generation of leaders may be 
incapable of reform.  Path dependency is a major problem for Russia, 
and it is highly likely that only time will heal the wounds.  Perhaps the 
best option for the current leaders is enact American agency principles 
                                                 
154 Black, supra note 2, at 1798. 
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and let implementation occur naturally. Since the Russian market 
cannot be forced to act in a certain way, the best move might simply be 
to equip future leaders with the proper tools to succeed, and the 
adoption of true agency principles is the proper tool. 
